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Professor Dalhuisen considers the possible effects within the Western banking system of 
the current crises in the banking sector in Asia.
The crisis we see today in Asia is in essence nothing more than an old-fashioned 'boom and bust' characterised by over-confidence in growth prospects, leading to an 
excessive increase in manufacturing capacity and inflow of funds 
in other assets, especially real estate. Some may say that the 
reasons are more profound, but I don't think so. As usual, most 
of the financing was short-term, in large part foreign funds. 
Such financing is, in times of prosperity, easy to attract at 
competitive interest rates when lenders take an increasingly rosy 
view of risk. This can go on for a long time, in fact, as long as 
lenders are willing to roll over their loans and provide more 
funds. But eventually, saturation becomes unavoidable when 
local demand cannot be increased, export is hindered by high 
exchange rates caused by the same large inflow of foreign funds, 
also by improperly thought out projects and insufficient 
upgrading of the product range. Devaluation and longer-term 
product refinement and rethinking must follow, but take time to 
work through the system, as they are not likely instantly to take 
care of all excess or useless capacity (in the process of being) 
created. Asset deflation in plant and land, the price of which is 
likely first to have been inflated, is the result. Bankruptcies 
loom, banks are squeezed, confidence evaporates and something 
has to give.
INDICATIONS OF CRISIS
Normally, the first signs are difficulty in servicing debt, 
particularly foreign debt, followed by a liquidity crisis, the 
sudden end to building sprees, sharp rises in unemployment and 
a stock exchange and land price collapse. Subsequently, the 
concern will be that governments may be asked, expected, 
tempted or forced to take the lead and try to spend themselves 
out of the problems. Deflation is then likely to be followed by 
inflationary fears. In this environment the currency will not only 
devalue, but also crash, even reaching irrational lows, especially 
in countries with political problems too, as is currently the case 
in South Korea and, particularly, Indonesia. If these adjustments 
happen quickly governments are apt to blame them on the 
nebulous army of speculators, but if the latter even do exist, they 
only take advantage of bad policies and do not create them. The 
accusations in this connection usually come from those who 
believe that government policies should be sacrosanct and not 
subject to the ordinary laws of economics, or are reminded of 
their existence. Often, however, it is not the professional 
speculator.
Heavy swings in values may simply happen because there is no 
depth left in the markets; a few local orders to sell shares or the 
local currency add disproportionately to the upheaval. The 
alternative is years of adjustment and there may therefore be
advantages in bubbles being burst in this way. The sharp, sudden 
shock concentrates the mind. Big devaluations quickly export 
some of the pain to others as the hope is for an export-led 
recovery. Yet this may also aggravate the problems elsewhere in 
the region. Another danger is that banks, if seriously 
mismatched between the currencies of their assets and 
liabilities, as in the present case, will be squeezed further and a 
whole banking crisis is then likely to develop. In such cases, the 
pressure on governments for bail-outs will naturally intensify.
This is where we are today in the Tiger economies and the 
scenario is, I think, mostly the same, although several 
commentators have pointed out the considerable differences 
between the various countries. It does not in my view greatly 
alter the patterns of cause and effect or the trigger: the loss of 
confidence started by a sudden realisation of excessive re- 
financing needs, leading to instant liquidity and banking 
problems, in the present case aggravated by mountains of short- 
term foreign debt. So the patient is ill but we know more or less 
what the disease is. The situation is certainly not unique and 
there is some comfort in that. In fact the consolation may well 
be that it has all been seen before. Perhaps people were so little 
on their guard exactly because they knew it would happen again. 
It may have been one of the reasons for the complacency of 
those who were supposed to know better, including the rating 
agencies. The virtual certainty that international help would 
subsequently become available may also have encouraged 
politicians and even central bankers to care less and pursue their 
growth policies in unsustainable irrational ways. The 
complacency that may be so engendered has led to a call for 
more IMF restraint (see George Shulpz, William Simon and 
Walter Wriston, 'Who needs the IMF?', Wall Street Journal 
(Europe), 4 February 1998).
CRITICISM OF THE IMF
Indeed, in the present crisis, G-7 promptly threw an 
international lifeline through the IMF. It is aimed at restoring 
confidence as soon as possible to re-establish the return of 
foreign funds   hopefully at longer maturities and at reasonable 
cost. In the meantime, the IMF is criticised for being too severe 
in its monetary and fiscal policy demands, and in its quest for 
liberalising trade and capital flows, for insisting on opening up 
the financial sector, especially in Korea, and for demanding 
western style principles to apply to shareholder protection. 
Several commentators have criticised this approach I am not 
sure they are right   quite apart from the fact that it is unwise 
to argue with your doctor when you are half-dead.
The IMF's aim is to promote sound economic principle, end 
Mickey Mouse capitalism and make governments give up their
unrealistic industrial pet projects. The IMF demands, therefore, 
greater discipline all round. This must be right, certainly for the 
moment in a situation where it is extremely tempting to loosen 
the monetary and fiscal policy, more than the present deflation 
tendencies should allow, in order to favour an inside crowd. 
Some see it as an American-inspired, unsubtle attempt to inhibit 
the Asian way of developing their societies and their growth 
policies, but they cannot prevail where, at the same time, the 
benefits of open markets are demanded. For these reasons it 
was, in my view, most unfortunate to start arguing about these 
terms or to nibble at them, as the Indonesian example has more 
than shown. The possibility of major government bail-outs, 
higher inflation and the continuation of governmental 
involvement in bank and industrial management, simply had to 
be curtailed through the IMF conditions. Yet because of these 
arguments, certainly also fuelled in the western press   perhaps 
the Keynesian inheritance   precious time has now been lost 
and, at this crucial moment, problems have been allowed to 
fester.
The unavoidable result has been the continuation of 
uncertainty, followed by further stock market and currency 
erosion, which had both already gone too far. The other serious 
consequence is greater refinancing costs for the countries 
concerned. Where the IMF is no bank of last resort, this 
refinancing is crucial and should follow promptly, but increasing 
costs will cause hesitation and further delay on the part of the 
affected governments. Some rescheduling and write-off will 
become necessary, but it should be limited so as not to 
undermine the credit standing of these countries further;o 7
restructuring is the next step. There is some time available as 
most companies, and even banks, will still be able to cover their 
current operating costs; governments protect deposits and few 
will be legally bankrupt, but this situation will not continue for 
ever and time is of the essence. The aim of the restructuring 
should be twofold: irrelevant and costly activities must be shed 
and lenders must be turned into shareholders or face losing 
much of their investment. No distinction should be made here 
between local and foreign investors. In such a scenario there 
should be no need for a general bail-out at all. I understand that 
local insolvency laws have no way of achieving this conversion 
promptly; in any event problematic in respect of secured 
creditors, even in countries that have more up-to-date laws in 
this respect. It is also clear that foreign banks will try to claim 
an exceptional position and as their re-financing help is crucial, 
they are in a strong position, but I wonder whether it is really in 
their own best interest to push too much, especially where their 
refinancing will not come cheap.
WHAT EFFECT IN ASIA?
Even if this can all be sorted out within a reasonable time 
frame, I think the effect will still be profound in Asia, although 
not permanent. The key is to prevent long-term stagnation, but 
also repeats; one would hope that over a two-year period much 
could be done. It may be that by portraying the IMF and the 
West as the baddies, the adjustment and re-structuring 
medicine can be taken quicker. The fact that India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan have not so far become much 
involved suggests that the crisis is localised and I doubt, 
therefore, whether its impact need be significant elsewhere in 
the world, as long as Japan and China are not seriously affected 
  I would agree that China is perhaps the key, with Hong Kong 
as an insecure backdoor. China and Japan would in any event
have to be the first in absorbing more imports from the 
countries concerned. In the West, the crisis could be some 
antidote against remaining inflationary pressures, although the 
burden would be very unevenly spread and fall first on the 
export industries. Competitive devaluations between the US, 
Japan and the EMU are possible in this connection and would 
not help. I am still optimistic that the worst, that is long years of 
stagnation or repeated busts, can be avoided for South-East Asia 
and a serious slow-down everywhere else. The expectation must 
be that the Tiger economies will re-establish themselves fairly 
quickly, but a more balanced future growth scenario must be 
established, while openness and transparency is a condition for 
it. Longer stagnation is by no means impossible, not even in a
disciplined, hardworking and high saving environment, as inr ' o o o '
Japan. This being said, the Japanese situation is of course very 
different, because of its lack of foreign debt and its huge 
reserves.
Although we have also seen very large asset deflation in shares 
and real estate in Japan, first pushed up by excess liquidity, it has 
so far not fatally affected the economy as a whole but has only 
led to more subdued or zero growth. The Yen at first even 
continued to rise dramatically and is only now weakening. In the 
meantime, the Japanese foreign surpluses continue unabated. It 
gives Japan more room to manoeuvre and allows it the luxury to 
indulge in its natural tendency not to do anything   not always 
bad if the alternative is unclear. It will, on die whole, only act 
when it is forced, internallv or externally, to do so and even then 
will only deal with those problems it can clearly see and define 
and pretend that all others do not exist. It will in any event not 
show any urgency. It is clear, however, that something will have 
to be done about its banks where we now see the depth of the 
problems.
Consolidation, with an elimination of spare capacity seems to 
me the answer, rather than a wholesale bail-out that will inspire 
no confidence. It is surprising that it has not already happened 
and that the government must now use the deregulation weapon 
to bring it about. The banks should also be cut loose from their 
groups and the cross-holdings should cease. The IMF might 
usefully organise the buying out of these holdings as the Financial 
Times suggests. I am not sure whether more government 
stimulation of the economy is the answer, or even if it is likely to 
be successful. Many are crying out for it, but it might only create 
further savings and saddle the government with considerable 
future problems where fiscal policy is already out of balance. In 
any event, the other Asian countries do not have these choices 
and cannot to the same extent indulge, and this is in a sense a 
good thing. The remedy may be severe for them but the pain is 
likely to be shorter.
CAUSES OF BANKING CRISES
There is similarity between Japan and the Tiger economies 
insofar as the instability of the banks poses its own threat and 
has not been confined to Asia. We have seen major banking 
crises in other parts of the world in the last 25 years, not only in 
developing countries, such as in South America after 1982, but 
more recently in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Many will remember the problems in the USA and Scandinavia, 
or the enormous write-offs in banking in France and even in 
Switzerland last year. In fact, the scale of banking problems in 
the last generation has been breathtaking, and is certainly not
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less than that in the 1930's. In my view there is ample evidence
that the inherent instability of banks has become an economic 
hazard in its own right and that the modern banking system 
itself is a major source of instability. Moreover, once there is an 
economic crisis, their involvement tends to make matters worse. 
Why should that be so and what can or should be done about it? 
This is the subject about which I should like to say a little more.
Bad management or bad supervision?
Banking crises are often said to be caused by bad management 
or bad supervision. That is unlikely to be the whole truth. Bad 
management is not necessarily the same as bad management 
decisions, to which good management is not immune; and 
supervision is not here to run a bank, only to check that the 
management is reasonably capable and honest, that proper 
systems are in place and capital adequacy rules are respected. 
No more can be expected unless banking supervisors want to 
run the whole system, which basically comes down to the 
nationalisation of the banking industry, a step no-one proposes 
any longer. Therefore, it must be left to management as to what 
to do within their capital ratios with the information provided 
by proper systems, and it is for that management to decide what 
risk to take. Bad management is likely to make more mistakes 
than good management, but neither they nor regulators can 
guard against outside changes such as deterioration in economic 
conditions with loans turning bad in economic down-turns and 
asset deflation affecting their security. Naturally, when a whole 
economic system changes, as we have seen in Eastern Europe, 
loans may become non-performing on a massive scale for 
reasons that have also nothing to do with management or 
supervision. The restructuring in such situations is an art of its 
own, a problem which China is now faced with.
Government pressure
It is therefore by no means always bad management or poor 
supervision that is the cause of banking crises. It was, I think, 
not the true problem in the present situation, although some 
would say that if was. The problem was rather that there was 
constant governmental pressure on bank management to ease 
credit to industry which had little access to capital markets and 
borrow where possible, home savings alone not being sufficient 
or cheap enough. In the meantime foreign banks were often 
pressured, by their own governments, to be aggressive and join 
in; such was the case in Germany. Government meddling is the 
bane of a nationalised banking system but it can also happen 
easily in a decentralised system, as can often be seen in 
developing countries. This is one problem and was, in the 
present circumstances, a key element. Moreover, there is a nasty 
habit in banking to follow the leader   a lemming instinct that
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easily leads to bad decisions. Banks may be subject to other 
adverse influences, e.g. from leading shareholders in industrial 
groups. It is easy to say that this shows at least weak 
management but no bank management can ignore the 
environment in which it must operate. The result is always more 
risk. Another most destabilising factor is in the basket of services 
that banks deliver, like deposit-taking, payment systems, 
investment banking services (including advice, underwriting and 
trading), investment management, and not forgetting their own 
treasury activity, which not seldom amounts to an in-house 
hedge fund. These activities are often cross-subsidised and the 
conglomerisation inherent in modern banking makes the good 
parts subject to the bad. Thus problems in one particular 
business may easily bring down the rest and have an instant 
outside effect.
It is all especially dangerous because of the wafer-thin capital 
requirements (8% of risk capital) which, in any event, do not 
allow for important market and business (mismatch) risks and 
are only meaningful against the background of inherent 
governmental guarantees. It is true of course that since 1995 the 
Bank for International Settlements has proposed a self- 
assessment system for market risk, based on the 'value at risk' 
approach, accepting banks' own sensitivity studies; but the 
capital required would not need to be more than three times the 
theoretical loss. Again, such an approach is only meaningful in 
the context of a government (or central bank) guarantee. This 
creates the problem of irresponsibility or moral hazard; this is 
well-known so I do not need to elaborate. But governments can 
seldom live up to these guarantees in full banking crises, never 
mind how much they have interfered before and how much 
their implicit guarantee was their excuse for doing so, and the 
bank management's excuse to accept this interference.
The result is that the required capital in situations when it 
truly matters will always be insufficient for the type of banks we 
have. That is the same as saying that modern banks inherently 
take too much risk, are structurally unstable and can never be 
safe in times of crisis. But there is more: when all goes well, low 
capital requirements allow banking services and especially credit 
to be cheap, an attractive proposition so it seems, but it also 
enables banks to start and fuel asset inflation spirals, especially 
stock exchange and land price booms. When the crunch comes 
they may, on the other hand, first start the liquidity squeeze and 
initiate the asset deflation. Thus banks with their present capital 
structure are not only inherently unstable   they also tend to 
aggravate inflation and deflation. The only thing one can say is 
that it has always been like this, but the question is, should it 
continue?
IS 'NARROW BANKING' PREFERABLE?
Should we not look more seriously at narrow banking as a 
better future model? (see also Martin Wolf, Financial Times, 6 
January 1998). The key is that it does not allow consumer 
deposits that need extra protection and the payment systems, to 
be run exclusively by banks in the present manner, therefore as 
part of their overall business. There is much to be said for 
separate money market funds with limited investment 
possibilities to be created for consumer depositors, and for the 
important payment systems to be split out of present banking 
activity. The latter to operate under central bank guidance. It is 
in any event improper that problems elsewhere in a bank should 
affect the basic consumer deposit and payment facilities. Under 
Glass-Steagall in the US we were of course used to other 
divisions (see Amicus Curiae, Issue 4, at p. 29); they proved in the 
end untenable, ineffective and probably even unnecessary. The 
split resulting from narrow banking is more fundamental and 
should at least take care of small depositors and systemic risk 
through the payment system.
Most importantly in the present context, the rest of banking 
should essentially be free and unsupervised. That would force 
these broad banks into normal commercial standards of 
behaviour and it should become clear to all that they do not 
operate as semi-public institutions. Moral hazards would 
disappear and, like in any other private business, undue 
government pressures would have to be resisted. There would 
not be an 8% capital adequacy standard. It should rise to 20% 
or higher, depending on what risk these financial conglomerates
wish to take; and what (large) depositors, other clients and 
credit agencies would think necessary if such institutions wanted 
to continue deposit-taking, public borrowing, underwriting, 
market-making and treasury functions   the latter often 
constituting in-house hedge funds. The argument heard against 
this is often that, in the case of a full blown banking crisis,o '
governments would still be required to save these institutions, 
but the higher capital needs would create a better inherent 
protection and bankruptcy of these institutions should not 
create greater hazards than that of any other companies of 
similar size. Higher capital requirements might even be 
imposed, although this would suck us back into all kind of 
regulation. In a more efficient world this should be avoided. 
Banking services would become more expensive, although stiff 
banking competition and open banking markets would help; so 
would more direct access of companies to capital markets. It 
means that the cost of the system is borne by customers rather 
than by taxpayers.
We will have to think about this in any event when banks 
consolidate further into maybe ten worldwide banks. Who 
would the bank of last resort of such monsters be, and who 
would save them in times of crises? How can they properly be 
regulated with regard to all their local operations? In the 
meantime most 'investment banks' are indeed no longer banks 
proper or institutions supervised by bank regulators. They are 
supervised by security regulators but it is a much lighter 
supervision and, except for the protection of small investors and 
the avoidance of market manipulation and insider dealing, one 
may well ask whether even that supervision proved to be at all 
necessary, useful or effective. In any event, these institutions, 
however subject to regulatory capital requirements, will be
more normally capitalised, as any large industry is. In this vein, 
governments have never found it necessary to prescribe capital 
for the oil industry or the pharmaceutical business, or any 
others. It may be remembered that the operations of investment 
banks and security houses were completely overlooked in the 
original EU approach to liberalising the financial services. They 
do not pose the same risks and a special regime for them only 
came in later.
In a system of broader banking that would be capitalised 
according to normal standards, bank survival chances would be 
much enhanced and systemic risk reduced. The idea is by no 
means new, but one wonders what more it takes to get
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movement on this front. It seems to me that the uncertainties 
about the nature of modern banks, their special position and 
related privileges, and whether in truth they operate in the 
public or private sphere, need to be cleared up. One must admit 
that the trend seems rather the other way. In the US mortgage 
banks, as narrow banks, were allowed to broaden out to full 
banking. The subsequent bankruptcies required a bail-out 
through tax money of a little less than US$100 billion. In Asia 
we have now seen banks as conduits for excess liquidity, no 
doubt within their regulatory capital adequacy requirements, get 
into deep trouble because of serious refunding problems and 
mismatches between assets and liabilities, leading to a liquidity 
squeeze upsetting the whole economy.
REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON BANKS
However managed or supervised, it seems to me that we 
should not be so dependent on banks and their behaviour; I 
think it doubtful whether modern economies really need such a 
system of recycling funds and providing random liquidity. The 
result only seems to be disaster. It leads me to repeat my long- 
held view that banking as we know it today, rather than being o y o
further pampered, should be forbidden. It is a dangerous 
business that I don't believe can be effectively contained by 
regulation. It can only be contained by sound economic 
principle. Regulation distorts here and provides, in its capital 
requirements, an appearance of safely that in the end only seem 
to cover the flank of regulators but protects no one else.
How do we get to such a system? The central banks in G-10 will 
have to take the lead and split out first payment systems and, 
subsequently, consumer deposit business. Thereafter they 
should ask themselves what to do with the rest. Deregulation 
should then get its chance. Or, to put it differently: while we 
nowr ask the Tiger economies to accept normal economic 
standards and principles of behaviour we should maybe also ask 
this from our own banks. @
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